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Abstract
In November 2019, the European Investment Bank (EIB) announced its ‘metamorphosis’ into a ‘Climate Bank.’ Associated
with the EU’s Green Deal, presented a month later, the EIB claimed to be the first international climate bank and a front
runner in the EU’s priority climate agenda. The EIB is mandated through the treaties to support EU policymakers. However,
with its ‘makeover,’ the EIB also announced the launch of a new climate strategy and energy lending policy, ending fossil
fuel financing after 2021. It is thus valuable to examine the question of whether the EIB has developed into a policymaker,
and if so, how this can be best understood. In exploring this question, this article follows a principal‐agent approach,
attempting to discern the rational interests behind organisational rhetoric and posits that the EIB’s claimed transforma‐
tion hints at a type of policymaking activism, exploiting a policy window to serve the EIB’s rational interests in a strained
political and market contest. This represents a paradigm shift in the EIB’s institutional behaviour and rhetoric within the
EU governance constellation and is, in fact, in this sense a ‘quantum leap’ as suggested by the EIB. However, it remains
to be seen if the bank’s metrics will prove a bold departure from their current activity or simply another adaptation to a
policy field of intense interest to the EU, as has occurred on several occasions in the past.
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1. Introduction
The European Investment Bank (EIB) has emerged as
one of the international community’s great success sto‐
ries of the post‐World War II era. Since its foundation
in 1957, the primary financial arm of the EU became
the world’s largest multilateral bank—as lender and
borrower—surpassing better‐known institutions, such as
the World Bank. With its operations undergoing pro‐
gressive international expansion in over 160 countries,
the bank has developed into a global actor. Set up to
address a market failure in long‐term capital flows to
post‐conflict Europe, the EIB has a dual nature that
is unique among multilateral banks—it is both an EU
body and a bank (Bussière, Dumoulin, & Willaert, 2008).
Accordingly, it combines its institutional character with
financial heft and technical knowledge. As a result of
the EIB’s dual nature, its activity has shifted on several
occasions, adapting to both policy and market develop‐
ments and reflecting the geo‐economic landscape aswell
as the ever‐emerging challenges, which call for global
collective action and financing. Originally geared toward
the EU’s harmonised and integrated development, the
EIB turned into a market‐making support mechanism
(Clifton, Diaz‐Fuentes, & Revuelta, 2014) and subse‐
quently a multifocal economic booster.
As a European body, the EIB has been increasingly
solicited by the EU to assist in facing these ever‐changing
challenges. There have been repeated calls from the
EU to extend the EIB’s objectives and its geographical
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and sectoral reach as well as to ‘strengthen’ its sup‐
port in times of economic downturn. In this vein, it has
been called upon to promote economic recovery against
the backdrop of the financial crisis through the frame‐
work of the Juncker Plan in 2014 and to support the
post‐pandemic fight and economic restart in 2020 (EIB,
2020a). Climate change is one of the defining issues of
our time which requires coordinated policy and action,
in which the EIB can play a key role, as it is empow‐
ered to do both. Financing is important for unlocking the
necessary investment for mitigating climate challenges
(Alonso & Cuesta, 2021). In November 2019, the EIB
announced its ‘metamorphosis’ into a ‘Climate Bank’:
Associated with the EU’s Green Deal, presented a month
later, the EIB claimed to be the first international public
climate bank and a front runner in the EU’s priority cli‐
mate agenda. In its EU institutional capacity, the EIB is
mandated through the treaties to support EU policy ini‐
tiatives and hence to follow rather than anticipate the
Commission. Nonetheless, upon publicizing its claimed
‘makeover’ into a climate bank, the EIB also simultane‐
ously revealed the launch of a new climate strategy and
energy lending policy ending fossil fuel financing after
2021. The EIB is relatively well‐positioned to play a proac‐
tive role in policymaking. Building on the green finan‐
cial and operational initiatives, which the bank started
to develop earlier than the Commission (as in the case
of the issuance of the green bonds in 2007, which came
well ahead of the Commission’s streamlined climate pol‐
icy involvement in 2015) the question is whether, and if
so for what reasons, the EIB adopted a new policymak‐
ing role. Consequently, it is worth researching whether
the EIB developed from a technocratic policy‐taker into
a policymaker, and if so, how this can be best understood.
Is the EIB’s ‘pivot’ to climate a paradigm change?
This article builds on existing scholarly work exam‐
ining the EIB’s evolving policymaking role (Clifton et al.,
2014; Liebe & Howarth, 2019; Mertens & Thiemann,
2017, 2019; Robinson, 2009). However, it examines a
new topic—the bank’s claimed transformation into a cli‐
mate bank—which is so recent that the academic com‐
munity has not yet had time to develop an interest in
it. The article is among the first, if not the first, to study
the EIB’s conversion into a climate bank, which thus con‐
stitutes its scientific contribution. The remainder of the
article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the
underlying theoretical framework and applied approach.
Section 3 provides a historic evolution of the bank’s insti‐
tutional trajectory in two sub‐sections, from its policy‐
taking days to modern‐day policymaking transforma‐
tions. Section 4 studies contextual insights related to the
background and motivations behind the EIB’s switch to
a climate bank and analyses whether the turn consti‐
tutes a preferred or forced change. Section 5 evaluates
whether the ‘pivot’ represents a paradigm shift and a
‘quantum leap.’ Finally, the conclusion provides a syn‐
thetic overview of the key findings.
2. Theoretical Framework and Methodology
As EIB’s nature goes well ‘beyond that of a financial
institution’ (van der Zwet, Bachtler, Miller, Vernon, &
Dozhdeva, 2016) being an EU body and a bank, this con‐
version influences EU governance as well as the market.
The article thus uses the sociology of markets as a con‐
ceptual framework, which explains the social relations
that exist between suppliers, producers, consumers, and
the state. It is a framework used for theorising pub‐
lic banks as dynamic institutions (Romero, 2020), which
allows the study of the EIB as an actor in relation to its
major stakeholders, such as other EU governance coun‐
terparts and market players. In particular, this article
analyses the background and motivation of EIB’s turn to
a climate bank—claimed to represent a ‘quantum leap’
(EIB, 2019b, p. 1). Accepting EIB’s challenge of a claimed
‘quantum leap,’ the article draws from quantummechan‐
ics. Specifically, it follows the view of Erwin Schrödinger
that it is meaningless to analyse individual objects in
real‐time. He proposed instead that only the scrutiny of
‘ensembles’ of many particles and their record over time,
can allow for understanding phenomena in their quan‐
tum trajectory. The article follows EIB’s quantum trajec‐
tory and attempts to answer the following research ques‐
tions: Is EIB’s ‘quantum leap’ just a further term in its
search for an identity in its perpetual pendular swing
between the two poles of its nature, acting upon EU
request and in alignment with new European policy, or
for other reasons? What could these reasons possibly
be? Is EU’s policy‐driven bank a policy‐taking or a poli‐
cymaking actor when changing into a ‘climate bank’?
The article concentrates on the EIB’s institutional
nature. In examining the research questions within its
chosen conceptual framework, the article examines the
EIB from a ‘collective dynamics’ perspective, drawing on
the sociology of markets, while examining the bank’s pol‐
icymaking and policymaking roles over‐time for under‐
standing its change into a climate bank. This frame‐
work helps to shed light on both faces of the bank’s
dual nature while viewing the EIB in interaction with its
stakeholders to study what is ‘at stake.’ The stakehold‐
ers prioritised for analysis in this research are primar‐
ily the EU member states (EIB shareholders), and sec‐
ondarily, the Commission, one of the three central EU
policymaking institutions. The role of other stakehold‐
ers, such as NGO’s, other multilateral banks, borrowers
and investors, is also taken into consideration, albeit to
a lesser extent. Given that markets are loci of exchange
involving cooperation and antagonism among rational
actors striving to fulfil a specific purpose (Hodson &
Peterson, 2017), the EIB’s ‘shift’ to a climate bank is analy‐
sed in relation to the varying interests of its stakehold‐
ers in order to identify the reasons—the EIB’s own or
external—that prompted such a ‘pivot.’
To analyse individual actors, which within the soci‐
ology of markets framework are considered as rational,
and to understand the EIB’s role in the EU governance
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constellation, the article uses rational choice institution‐
alism, notably a principal‐agent model approach, well
suited and used in literature to study European gover‐
nance actors and regional development banks, such as
the EIB (Clifton, Diaz‐Fuentes, & Howarth, 2021; Fontan
& Howarth, 2021). The methodology used is based on
academic literature that has approached the EIB from
similar angles—principal‐agent model (Liebe & Howarth,
2019), and sociology of markets (Mertens, & Thiemann,
2019)—as well as different perspectives and more gen‐
eral perspectives, and a review of official documents,
consisting mainly of public speeches, press releases,
and annual reports, including elements relevant to the
research questions. Viewing the EIB as the agent and
the EU member states and the Commission as principals
and policymakers who use the agency to maximise their
objectives, the principal‐agent model is useful for inves‐
tigating the causal influences of their interactions on
EU governance and policymaking (Pollack, 1997). Given
that the principal‐agent models assume that the inter‐
ests of principals and agents diverge due to informa‐
tional asymmetry, to the advantage of the agent, the
results of such an analysis can unveil the background
of EU decision‐making and governance transformations.
It is precisely this asymmetry that ‘empowers’ and moti‐
vates the agent to act in his own best interests. Thus, the
principal is in a position to prescribe the pay‐off rules
in the relationship by limiting the ability of the agent to
exercise policy discretion (Hooghe, 1999). The principal‐
agent model allows one to gauge whether and when the
EIB was called by the principals or if instead, it exploited
the political context and available policy windows and
acted as a policy entrepreneur when it ‘became’ a cli‐
mate bank. In this way, the article delves into whether
and how the rational interests of the bank have led to
the EIB’s ‘pivot.’ Subsequently, it evaluates whether the
EIB’s turn constitutes a discontinuous change or, in other
words, a ‘quantum leap,’ as suggested by the EIB.
3. The EIB’s Quantum Trajectory: From Policy‐Taking
to Policymaking
The starting point of this research is a longitudinal study
of EIB as an agent, attempting to identify whether it
has been acting as the policy‐taker of the principal’s line
and whether there are eventual deviations or changes
of course.
3.1. Policy‐Taking
Founded in 1958 by the Treaty of Rome as the EU’s
bank, the EIB is the EU’s long‐term lending arm. The EIB
has a historical presence in Europe. Its statute has
been annexed as a protocol in seven successive EU
Treaties. The EIB’s qualitative and quantitative develop‐
ment mirrors the evolution of the Union, adapting to
calls to accommodate successive enlargements and pri‐
ority reorientations. These are reflected in the bank’s
ever‐evolving activity objectives, geographical spread,
the volume of operations as well as its structure and pro‐
cesses. Accordingly, the EIB has portrayed itself as a prin‐
cipal vehicle for implementing EU economic policies.
The EIB business model is based on three pillars of
value‐added: (i) consistency with EU policies, support
for the EU priority objectives and EU policy dialogue
with partner countries; (ii) project technical, economic,
environmental and social appraisal and conditionality;
and (iii) EIB financial and non‐financial contribution to
the project. The EIB transfers the financial advantage
of its funds to the beneficiaries and leverages addi‐
tional finance from the public and private sector (EIB,
2011, p. 3).
For more than thirty years, the EIB has viewed itself
as a technocratic implementation agency “having no
organic ties with other Community institutions” (EIB,
1987, p. 3), “autonomous” (EIB, 1991, p. 1; Robinson,
2009, p. 652) and independent (Peterson, 2004). EIB’s
“independence” (EIB, 1987, p. 16) as proclaimed explic‐
itly by President Bröder, let the EIB’s bank‐side curve
out and dominate over its institutional‐side. The bank’s
independence has also continued to prevail under the
presidency of Sir Brian Unwin, stressing in parallel the
bank’s institutional role until the early 2000s: “The EIB
it is in a sense the Unions ‘house bank’ operating as an
autonomous non‐profit maximising financing institution,
owned by the 15 UnionMember States” (EIB, 1996, p. 1).
Subsequently, the EIB started to downplay its indepen‐
dence, highlighting a ‘policy‐driven’ aspect, consistent
with the bank’s intention of closer integration in the EU
institutional constellation, while continuing to stress its
dual capacity. As stated by President Maystadt:
The EIB is no ordinary bank: It was created specifi‐
cally to provide financial support to the EU’s objec‐
tives. I describe this special character with the term
‘policy‐driven bank,’ namely a bank which in synergy
with the other EU institutions and without burden‐
ing the public purse, contributes to the realisation of
projects giving concrete expression to the economic,
social and ultimately, political priorities of the Union.
(EIB, 2001, p. 4)
Since 2011, under the current president, Hoyer, the term
‘policy’ has been dropped, albeit increasingly and sys‐
tematically ‘showcasing’ the EIB’s institutional role by
branding the EIB as ‘the EU bank’ (EIB, 2012, p. 4).
Nevertheless, progressive differentiation started there‐
after. While demonstrating self‐confidence by projecting
its size—for the first ever time in a president’smessage in
an annual report—as “the world’s largest supranational
borrower” (EIB, 2011, p. 5), it appears that the EIB is in
search of an identity. In different months in 2019, its self‐
characterisations ranged from a ‘crowding‐in bank’ (EIB,
2019a, p. 12) to a ‘climate bank’ (EIB, 2019b). This leads
to a question: Is the EIB’s ‘quantum leap’ simply a further
term in its search for an identity? A further adaptation to
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a policy field of intense interest to the EU, as on several
occasions in the past? Or does the ‘pivot’ to a climate
bank point to an EIB turn toward policymaking?
Beyond the EIB’s agency role, its policy‐taking has
also been specifically, consistently, and increasingly
emerging in its top officials’ discourse over time. Under
the Le Portz presidency in the 1970s, the bank described
itself as “translating into practice the priorities, as formu‐
lated by the EIB’s Governors, who are themember states’
Ministers of Finance or Economy” (EIB, 1984, p. 10).
Policy‐taking continued to emerge explicitly or implicitly
in later years, and President Bröder observed that the
EIB “has constantly adapted its activity in keeping with
successive enlargements of the European Commission
and developments in Community policies, thereby serv‐
ingMember States’ needs as effectively as possible” (EIB,
1988, p. 3). Similarly, President Unwin described the
bank’s remit as “furthering the Union’s priority economic
objectives” (EIB, 1994, p. 5), and President Maystadt
explained that “the Bank has defined itself as a pub‐
lic policy bank, and seeks to interpret this to the maxi‐
mum as congruence with EU policy as developed prin‐
cipally by the Commission” (EIB, 2005, p. 1). President
Maystadt explicitly stated that the EIB “does not have as
part of its remit the power to define policies” (Bussière
et al., 2008, p. 6). Following the same line, the cur‐
rent president, Hoyer, has claimed that the EIB is “pro‐
viding finance and expertise for sound and sustainable
investment projects which contribute to furthering EU
policy objectives. The EIB also implements the finan‐
cial aspects of the EU’s external and development poli‐
cies” (European Parliament, 2013, p. 2). Not only has the
EIB portrayed itself as a policy‐taker; it has been also
viewed as such by its stakeholderswhen asked to support
the implementation of evolving EU policies. Through the
Council, the EU member states have regularly called
on the EIB to support changing policies in a constantly
mutating context by altering its objectives, volume and
geographical reach in order to assist European policy
objectives. Starting with the provision of development
finance in the 1960s, examples over the years include
the addition of other objectives, such as energy in the
1970s, the environment in the 1980s, priority lending
to the Trans‐European Networks in the 1990s, increased
support for innovation in the 2000s, assisting economic
recovery after the global economic crisis in the 2010s,
and the Covid‐19 pandemic in 2020. The Commission
has also been calling on the EIB to “step up its efforts
in designing new instruments” to support investments
in green innovation (European Commission, 2005, p. 4).
For the European Parliament, “The EIB is in fact a finan‐
cial instrument serving Community policies” (European
Parliament, 2000, p. 3). Peer multilateral banks have also
been viewing the EIB as a policy‐taker, given that “it
makes long‐term finance available for sound investment
in order to contribute towards EU policy goals” (Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2016, p. 1). In the same
fashion, NGOs expect that “the EIB is supposed to fol‐
low EU legislation in its activities both in and outside EU”
(Feiler & Stoczkiewicz, 1999, p. 5).
3.2. From Policy‐Taking to Policymaking
In line with typical agency dilemma situations, while
EIB’s official rhetoric has focused on its policy‐taking
role, its practices have been increasingly drifting towards
policymaking. The EIB has been tacitly but systemat‐
ically prioritising its rational interests, departing from
its technical know‐how stronghold, with climate change
being the latest example. Cognizant of this shift, the
academic community has called for research on the
bank’s policymaking role (Clifton et al., 2014; Liebe
& Howarth, 2019; Mertens & Thiemann, 2017, 2019;
Robinson, 2009). Theseworks have demonstrated a grad‐
ual and careful EIB shift from a policy‐taking to a policy‐
making role, demonstrating normal entrepreneurship or
policy entrepreneurship activism, depending onwhether
the pendulum was on the side of the bank or the insti‐
tution, respectively. As a result, the EIB’s aspirations to
make a more proactive contribution to EU policy objec‐
tives have been revealed, albeit remaining ‘under the
radar.’ Additionally, these works explored some of the
subtle ways the EIB has been shirking and exploiting the
political context and policy windows to increase its pol‐
icy influence.
However, the situation changed when the EIB openly
claimed, for the first time, a policymaking role under
the current president. Confirming the bank’s politici‐
sation (Mertens & Thiemann, 2019), President Hoyer
argued that he was the one who had pushed the
Juncker plan along with Commission President Juncker.
In a speech for Luxembourg’s ‘movers and shakers’ in
October 2015, he mentioned that he and President
Juncker worked together to create the Juncker Plan, and
he went on to explain the importance of the EIB in this
policy development:
When I met with Jean‐Claude Juncker in the summer
of 2014, he was preparing his program for becom‐
ing the new President of the Commission….This is the
point where Jean‐Claude Juncker and myself agreed
to enable EIB to take risks on a much larger scale.
If you want, this was the birth of the Investment Plan
for Europe, or better known as the Juncker‐Plan. (EIB,
2015b, p. 14).
President Hoyer also confirmed EIB’s politicisation as a
“political instrument…[as it] serves a political purpose”
(Toplensky & Barker, 2019).
4. The EIB’s Climate ‘Pivot’ Context
Tying back to the main thrust of this research, when
President Hoyer explained the EIB’s ‘makeover’ into
a climate bank at the bank’s annual conference in
January 2020, he followed the same line: “We listened
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to the European Council and to the President of the
Commission, Ursula von der Leyen” (EIB, 2020a, p. 8).
Seen from a principal and agency perspective, this
statement—seemingly submissive—can be viewed as
the starting point of a paradigm shift in the EIB’s position‐
ing in the EU governance setting. This statement is unlike
his earlier rhetoric and the EIB’s customary policy‐taking
discourse, showcasing the bank’s efforts to “deliver on
commitments to Member States” (EIB, 2015a, p. 1) or
“to deliver on the promise of the Investment Plan for
Europe calls” concerning the Commission (EIB, 2015b,
p. 4). The 2020 statement could even be interpreted
as an attempt to refer to the EIB as inter pares with
the Council and the Commission. Although one should
observe how the EIB rhetoric will evolve, there is further
evidence of this. First and foremost, the timing of EIB’s
‘pivot’ shows some intention to break away and chal‐
lenge the EU governance set‐up. The EIB released the
news of its ‘transformation’ on November 14, 2019 (EIB,
2019b), well before von der Leyen’s Commission pre‐
sented the European Green Deal on December 11, 2019
(European Commission, 2019). This constitutes a change
in the paradigm in which the EIB announcements usu‐
ally postdate the Council and the Commission for cour‐
tesy reasons, as expected in a principal‐agent relation.
Second, the EIB’s congruent new climate strategy and
energy lending policy ending fossil fuel financing after
2021 and its simultaneous pledge of one trillion Euros
by 2030 for climate change, publicised upon its ‘pivot,’
demonstrate a policymaking role. The latter, seen in con‐
junction with the EIB’s pioneering climate‐related capi‐
tal market activity—well before the Commission stream‐
lined its climate finance policy in 2015—shows that the
bank has been feeling relatively well‐positioned to play
a more pro‐active role in this area. Third, the context
of the EIB proclamation falls during a period of tough
negotiations in EU circles concerning the EIB’s position
within an eminent reshaping of the economic gover‐
nance set‐up related to: (i) the creation of a European
development bank, with three possible scenarios under
discussion, including an EIB subsidiary, an European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) subsidiary
and an independent institution as the third option; and
(ii) the InvestEU, as a successor to the growth‐promoting
Juncker plan for the period 2021–2027. In these negotia‐
tions, the EIB appears to be losing its historic primacy of
being entrusted with the exclusivemandate of managing
EU funding or guarantees as the EU bank. In this context,
the EIB is placed almost on par with other multilateral
and national banks, although maintaining a preferential
position, managing 75% of these resources. Depriving
the EIB of its monopoly over the EU budget seems to be
a new paradigm, also followed by the Commission under
the European Green Deal:
The Commission will also work with the EIB Group,
national promotional banks and institutions, as well
as with other international financial institutions. The
EIB set itself the target of doubling its climate target
from 25% to 50% by 2025, thus becoming Europe’s
climate bank. (European Commission, 2019, p. 16)
In addition to the paradigm shift in the EIB’s principal
and agent role‐setting, the above analysis suggests that
the EIB’s ‘transformation’ into a climate bank was delib‐
erated during strained institutional and market condi‐
tions. To better understand the prevailing background,
particularly the EIB–stakeholder interaction, this article
draws on a sociology of markets perspective. First, the
profiles of the stakeholders are discussed along with
the reasons for including them in this analysis. The EIB
and its EU governance stakeholders have similar pref‐
erences regarding climate action, given an apparent
change in public and institutional sentiment about the
significance of the issue. The EU member states are the
EIB’s top‐ranking stakeholders, as they are the bank’s con‐
stitutionally exclusive shareholders. Serving their inter‐
ests and needs is EIB’s raison d’être and the sine qua
non‐condition for its existence. In turn, its sharehold‐
ers have demonstrated extraordinary and continuous
support, as evidenced by successive capital increases.
The EIB enjoys the strongest shareholding support of all
multilateral banks, mainly because its shareholders are,
on the one hand, exclusively high‐income industrialised
countries, and on the other hand, because they are the
EIB’s prime beneficiaries, with a historic average of 90%
of the bank’s aggregate annual lending. Obviously, share‐
holders’ support also recognises the bank’s agency ser‐
vices in delivering upon their calls, adapting its activity
to their ever‐changing topical demands. Nevertheless, in
parallel to their recent support—demonstrated by the
replenishing of the EIB’s capital post‐Brexit—EU mem‐
ber states have also expressed a desire to reform the EIB
and obtain a higher level of control through the EU gov‐
ernance setup, including supervision of the EIB by the
European Central Bank (Brunsden & Khan, 2018; Khan,
2018; Mertens & Thiemann, 2018). In a lead‐role among
member states, France has been promoting:
The idea of creating a bank to concentrate on climate
change…[and] Ursula von der Leyen… signalled that
shifting the mandate of the European Investment
Bank is among the options under consideration
[while announcing to the European Parliament on
10 July 2019 the ‘transformation’ of the EIB] into a
European climate bank, a green bank, we will be role
models worldwide. (Krukowska, 2019)
Member states’ goading and the European Commission’s
support of the need to turn Europe into a climate
cause front‐runner prior to the EIB’s ‘pivot’ proclama‐
tion in November 2019 raises further questions about
the timing of and reasons for the bank’s announcement.
The EIB’s rush to anticipate the Commission’s Green Deal
makes the exploration of these questions more pressing.
The Commission, as the ‘guardian of the Treaties’ and de
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facto part of the EU policymaking scene, has a seat on
the EIB Board of Directors and is becoming an increas‐
ingly important stakeholder of the EIB, due to strength‐
ened joint action. In the run‐up to the new Commission
leadership, the Commission saw climate change as a
way to mark its tenure, as it: (i) reflects public sen‐
timent; (ii) would be able to consolidate the EU’s cli‐
mate worldview; and (iii) has growth potential because it
touches all sectors of social and economic activity (Rifkin,
2011). Investments in climate‐related areas are inter‐
twinedwith quality of life as well as research, innovation,
and industry 4.0. For financing investment schemes, the
Commission is happy to rely on the EIB’s agency skills.
In need of specialised finance skills, the Commission
views the EIB as a reliable and highly qualified technical
partner with which “it has strengthened collaboration…
and created stronger links between structural funds and
the new financial instruments with the aim of leverag‐
ing… investment” (European Commission, 2019, p. 19).
In this sense, the Commission is the EIB’s sister organ‐
isation, offering the EIB a unique comparative advan‐
tage among its multilateral peers (Kavvadia, 2021). Their
long‐established cooperation covers policy and imple‐
mentation arrangements, including funding and guaran‐
tees. In the EU governance setting, the two institutions
have been conceived in a principal‐agent relationship
since the 1960s, when the EIB was mandated to provide
financing outside the Union. Their relations have been
characterised by the typical agency dilemma inherent
in a “cultural gap” (European Parliament, 2016, p. 103)
and “discontent” (Mertens & Thiemann, 2019, p. 21).
Nevertheless, the two have increasingly been leaning on
each other to address operational issues under various
mandates. The EIB has been comforting the Commission
by providing technically sound mandate management,
while the Commission has bolstered the EIB with fund‐
ing and risk coverage. The latter has been actively sought
by the EIB in situations of high risk and during times
of turmoil, such as the introduction of the euro, the
global financial and economic crises, and the Covid‐19
pandemic. With this increasing cooperation, however,
the Commission feels a stronger need for exercising
greater control over the ‘resisting’ EIB (Counter Balance,
2020b). With the Green Deal, cooperation with the EIB
in the relatively new area of the green finance agenda is
important for the Commission, which did not engage in
mainstream implementation of climate action policy in
capital‐markets until around 2015, whereas the EIB struc‐
tured its environmental involvement earlier, through the
pioneering issuance of green bonds in 2007. This coop‐
eration among the two EU actors did not go unnoticed
by another EIB stakeholder, the European Parliament.
The Parliament’s current ‘greener’ composition is fully
in line with the new EU policy agenda, acknowledging
the benefits of Commission–EIB cooperation in green
finance while also demanding increased control over the
EIB (Counter Balance, 2020b). In its 2016 study of the
EIB’s role in EU’s cohesion policy, the Parliament acknowl‐
edged that the Commission had to rely increasingly on
the EIB’s expertise and anticipated this pattern to further
strengthen in the future based on the experiences from
the financial crisis (European Parliament, 2016).
Beyond the EU governance set‐up, the EIB context is
also determined, shaped, and influenced by the bank’s
peers, which in the sociology of markets framework are
viewed as key organisational stakeholders. Within the
multilateral banks market, the EIB has already surpassed
all of its peers, including the World Bank, in terms of
capital and volume of activity. Despite the recent addi‐
tion of new institutions in themultilateral banking scene,
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and
the New Development Bank, the EIB’s leading position
seems currently unchallenged (Kavvadia, 2021). Given
the global importance of the climate, 11 of the multilat‐
eral banks, including the EIB, have agreed to deepen their
collaboration to promote sustainable infrastructure (EIB,
2017a) as a further example of cooperation initiatives.
While certainly not excluding competition among peers,
projecting cooperation is important for the relevance of
public banks, especially in light of the increased scrutiny
concerning their relevance, mainly from think‐tanks and
NGOs. As a result of this scrutiny in recent years, the slow
climate action of multilateral banks has been voiced as
anNGOprime concern. Uniquely equipped to implement
policy and funding in a wide cross‐border area, these
banks are best suited for dealing with new and diverse
global challenges, such as climate change. In 2016, there
were already calls for turning the World Bank into a
climate bank and “renaming the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development… as the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Sustainable Development”
(Montek, Lawrence, & Andrés, 2016). The World Bank,
having a world‐wide membership and being closest to
the UN global climate policymaking, would be an ideal
candidate to take over the climate funding leadership,
for “making financial flows consistent with a pathway
towards greenhouse gas emissions and climate‐resilient
development” (United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, 2015). Given that, in the sociology
of markets framework, actors operate through agency,
“framing and entrepreneurship” (Fligstein, 2011, p. 7),
the EIB has slipped into the role of a lead multilateral cli‐
mate financier aware of the position of its peers. The EIB
has obviously used a policy window to its advantage,
building on its strength of having shareholders commit‐
ted both to the climate cause and the EIB. The bank
could therefore act swiftly and establish itself as the first
international climate bank. Although better positioned,
it is difficult for the World Bank to achieve such a major
‘transformation’ due to its wide shareholding basis and
concomitant slower processes. The EBRD also has ambi‐
tious climate policy and funding aspirations (van de Ven,
2017). It has been “a global leader at financing green
investments, most notably through the private sector”
(EBRD, 2020, p. 1), and in 2020 green energy represents
50% of its annual funding. Nevertheless, the EBRD did
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not make a decisive move on climate finance, possibly
because it was more focused on ‘bearing down’ on the
EIB in terms of geographical reach, product mix and
most importantly political support within the EU, asmen‐
tioned earlier. The EIB was the first to put on the cli‐
mate bank hat, thus getting a head start and further
strengthening its positioning among its peers. NGOs are
the natural activist stakeholder in the EIB’s ‘makeover.’
Starting from strained relations and a complete disap‐
proval of “EIB’s actual disregard for environmental con‐
siderations…[and the fact that]… the EIB is supposed to
follow EU legislation in its activities… but does not seem
to do so” (Feiler & Stoczkiewicz, 1999, p. 5), NGOs obvi‐
ously hailed EIB’s ‘pivot,’ considering it largely as a vic‐
tory. After this rough start in the 1990s and the ‘bumpy’
relations with the NGOs, the EIB focused on increasing
its knowledge and expertise in green finance. Indeed, it
is thanks to prodding by NGOs that the EIB presented a
new environmental policy containing numerous positive
statements and requirements in 1996, becoming more
climate aware and proactive in the last 10 years. Its green
financial initiatives and environmentally upgraded oper‐
ational criteria and processes have prepared the ground
for assuming a prime role in the green market and
finance policymaking. However, NGOs cannot be seen as
the prime motivator of EIB’s ‘pivot,’ rather, they acted as
a supportive stakeholder. The last category of EIB stake‐
holders of interest in this research includes the bank’s
investors and borrowers. The former have already shown
positive responses to the EIB’s climate aspirations by sup‐
porting the bank’s green bonds, representing on average
6.5% of the EIB’s yearly issuance programme, while the
latter account for 25% of the EIB’s yearly lending activity
on average. While these volumes constitute a good start‐
ing point—both on the asset aswell as the liability side of
the bank—they do not appear sufficient for an EIB turn‐
about into a purely climate bank. Consequently, the EIB
does not appear ‘mature’ in its complete ‘makeover’ to a
climate bank from a quantitative perspective. Increasing
its lending to the interim target of 50% by 2025 from its
record of 31% in 2018 appears challenging. This seems
even more true in the post‐pandemic context, as several
investments will be halted and new investment priori‐
ties will be set, mainly in support of existing assets and
entrepreneurial undertakings. Nevertheless, on the lia‐
bility side, with more than €16 billion issued in the green
format across 11 currencies, the EIB remains one of the
largest issuers of green bonds (EIB, 2017b, p. 3).
The above analysis reveals that EIB’s ‘pivot’ to a cli‐
mate bank is not based on business grounds, given that
its climate borrowing and lending activity (6.5% and 25%,
respectively) do not justify such a radical step. The EIB’s
‘metamorphosis’ into a climate bank targets climate‐
related lending of 50% of its aggregate annual lending
within five years. Unlike its institutional side, which is
aligned to EU policy objectives, the EIB’s bank side is
demand driven. In 2018, its environment lending was
€17 billion, that is, 31% of the total annual lending of
€55,6 billion. Extrapolating from these figures—ceteris
paribus and based on the EIB’s projection of maintaining
the same lending volume (EIB, 2020b)—the EIB would
have to achieve an additional €10 billion of climate lend‐
ing beginning in 2025. Of course, the EBRD has already
achieved green finance of 46% of its aggregate annual
funding. Although the EBRD is much smaller than the
EIB, in absolute terms this amounts to €4,6 billion (i.e.,
1/3 of the EIB’s 2018 climate volume, prior to its ‘pivot’).
The question of whether there are enough investment
projects qualifying under climate funding is beyond the
scope of this research and remains open, especially as
climate‐related projects are characterised by a higher
innovation intensity and risk profile. With regard to its
borrowing activity, the EIB has not committed to a target.
5. EIB’s Quantum Leap?
Returning to the analysis above, although not pub‐
licly evident, the EIB decided on its ‘pivot’ based on
an increasing trend toward ‘politicisation’ on grounds
related to its stakeholders rather than business reason‐
ing. The EIB has been acting as a policy entrepreneur,
applying rational long‐term thinking and a risk/benefit
analysis. Driven by its principal interest of political and
market relevance, the bank exploited a policy window
and announced its ‘transition’ to a climate bank in a
swift and timely manner. More specifically, for reasons
of political relevance, the EIB has sought to primarily sat‐
isfy the EU member states, as they are its top‐priority
stakeholders. In doing so through its ‘pivot,’ the EIB also
rendered service to the Commission, which was seek‐
ing ways to satisfy the EU member states while shap‐
ing its ambitious Green Deal plan. Having said that,
the EIB was not acting as a policy‐taker, not merely
because it consciously raised its public profile as a pol‐
icymaker by pre‐empting the Commission announce‐
ments. Faced with pressure from its stakeholders, the
EIB acted aggressively as a policy entrepreneur, aim‐
ing to change the game, shifting from being challenged
to taking the lead and becoming the game‐maker. In
recent years, the EIB has been challenged by some of
the EU member states, which have called for radical
reforms (Mertens & Thiemann, 2019). Additionally, the
bank has been under pressure from the Commission as
well. In search of increased control, the Commission has
been curtailing the bank’s traditionally privileged posi‐
tion as the exclusive mandate manager of EU funds and
guarantees by offering ‘cake’ slices to new ‘beneficia‐
ries,’ such as the National Promotional Banks and the
EBRD. Furthermore, the European Parliament has also
been asking for increased control over the EIB since the
early 2000s, when the EIB approached the Commission
for stronger cooperation, as mentioned above. Naturally,
the NGOs have been calling for EIB’s decarbonisation.
Meanwhile, peers have also joined the ‘pressure circle.’
The EBRD has been ‘conquering’ market territory and
becoming stronger compared to the EIB, extending its
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activities in new regions and countries, beyond its orig‐
inal remit, even within the EU—the EIB’s ‘stronghold’—
in countries such as Greece and Cyprus. By sharpen‐
ing its image and political influence, it has strengthened
and extended its cooperationwith the Commission. Even
within the EU economic governance setting, the EBRD
has often been placed on par with the EIB, despite
its non‐EU institutional global membership, including
American, Asian, and Oceanian countries. In this situ‐
ation, where stakeholders seek increased control over
an organisation that has grown to become the world’s
largest multilateral bank, the EIB’s quantum leap seems
to be motivated by its rational interests of escaping EU
political pressure andmaintaining its relevance. The EIB’s
interests are topped by the bank’s endeavours to main‐
tain its relevance and safeguard its positioning, mainly
in the EU governance context and, to a lesser extent,
in the multilateral banking context. The EIB’s observed
propensity to assume a policymaking role contributes
to its vital interest in controlling the developments and
guiding them toward preferred solutions through early
participation in the agenda‐setting. Climate action has
been chosen as the battering ram for breaking into the
EU institutional policymakers’ club for the following rea‐
sons: (i) it has wide political support; (ii) it is topical, but
with a long‐term future horizon; and (iii) the EIB is well
placed to play a lead role given its long held and recog‐
nised expertise in climate finance.
The leap was swift and well timed to exploit a win‐
dow of opportunity during a developing situation within
the EU governance context. This first‐entrant act solidi‐
fied EIB’s institutional and market position, building on
its previously recognised climate mastery. While essen‐
tial for supporting the implementation of EIB’s ‘pivot,’ its
business metrics do not yet justify its climate ‘makeover’
and cannot be seen as the factors motivating the conver‐
sion. Acting as a policy entrepreneur, the EIB used a pol‐
icy window in a period of ‘malaise’ in the run‐up tomajor
changes in the European economic governance, some of
which directly concern its activity in the EU as part of
the InvestEU and others its role outside the EU in a new
institutional European development banking set‐up (cur‐
rently under consideration). The EIB’s climate turn is a
paradigm shift toward policymaking and agency activism
to satisfy the bank’s rational interests of political andmar‐
ket relevance.
6. Conclusions
In a combined act in November 2019, the EIB ‘meta‐
morphosed’ into a climate bank, while also announcing
the launch of a new climate strategy and energy lending
policy ending fossil fuel financing after 2021 and includ‐
ing targets and milestones. By pre‐empting the EU offi‐
cial announcements concerning the Green Deal, which
the EIB’s ‘pivot’ is to support, and by using in parallel
a rhetoric that deviates from the bank’s customary dis‐
course, the announcement constitutes a paradigm shift
in the EIB’s institutional behaviour. In this case, instead
of its historical ‘policy‐taking’ attitude, the EIB deliber‐
ately wished to take centre stage and enter the spot‐
light, a course usually taken by the policymaking actors
within the EU governance. Furthermore, the act has not
been justified by the bank’s prior climate metrics, which
at the time of the announcement were below those of
some of the EIB’s peers, and represented only a quar‐
ter of its aggregate annual lending, compared to half
of the annual activity showcased by some of the peers.
In this sense, the EIB’s ‘pivot’ announcement diverges
from the bank’s path‐dependent evolution and custom‐
ary rhetoric, and as such, constitutes a ‘quantum leap,’
as stated by the EIB.
The article, therefore, argues that capitalising on its
reputation, the EIB’s resounding climate ‘conversion’ can
be understood through its trend toward increased politi‐
cisation. The climate ‘conversion’ constitutes further evi‐
dence of the EIB’s aspirations to make a more proactive
contribution to EU policy objectives, as already revealed
by several scholars. Demonstrating agency activism as a
policy entrepreneur, the EIB used a policy window pre‐
sented during a period of ‘malaise’ and fermentation
in the run‐up to major changes in the European eco‐
nomic governance set‐up, to raise its profile for improved
political and market positioning. Having grown to be the
world’s largest multilateral bank, a greener EIB agenda—
consolidating and building on the bank’s climate finance,
renowned mainly due to its pioneering climate‐related
capital market activity—can have important implications
for the economy, climate, and governance in the EU
and beyond. However, whether the EIB’s announcement
will go beyond the ‘quantum leap’ in the bank’s pub‐
lic appearance, to constitute a real metamorphosis, can
only be benchmarked against the bank’s future metrics.
They will prove either a bold new departure from previ‐
ous activity or simply an adaptation to a new European
priority policy field, as has occurred on several occasions
in the past.
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